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February 11, 2011 Jim Frasche has begun his own blog. His past postings on the Muftic Forum website will remain on this page. However, for any future comments, visit his blog at http://jfrasche.blogspot.com
Email from Jim Frasche Jan.30, 2011 I thought you would be interested in my latest column, in the Vail Colorado Daily, on Afghanistan: We are at a critical juncture in our commitment to the Afghan people, and it is important to focus on the "good news", which generally goes unreported: - the Afghan people's opinion that their country is moving in a positive direction has trended upwards for the last three straight years. - 85% of the violence is confined to four provinces. - foreign investment, building and construction, school enrollment... so many of the indicators we have been working, waiting,and working for are consistent;y trending up. For those of you serving our country, thank you! For the rest of us, please stay committed to America's efforts to bring Afghanistan fully back into the world community of nations. I thought you would be interested in my latest column, in the Vail Colorado Daily, on Afghanistan: We are at a critical juncture in our commitment to the Afghan people, and it is important to focus on the "good news", which generally goes unreported: - the Afghan people's opinion that their country is moving in a positive direction has trended upwards for the last three straight years. - 85% of the violence is confined to four provinces. - foreign investment, building and construction, school enrollment... so many of the indicators we have been working, waiting,and working for are consistent;y trending up. For those of you serving our country, thank you! For the rest of us, please stay committed to America's efforts to bring Afghanistan fully back into the world community of nations. Feel free to disseminate the link to the column as you see appropriate.
Pashtunwali, Islam, and Democracy in Afghanistan- What’s Our Commitment?
By James W. Frasche September 6, 2009
When most Americans hear about my work in Afghanistan, they are surprised, and sometimes even shocked to hear that I went there not just to make money by exploiting opportunities in a post-war economy, but also to have a real impact on the quality of life of the Afghan people. Even once you go beyond explaining that it was not Afghans who flew the planes on 9-11, they really cannot understand why I would be so passionate about such a place, and why I would be at all interested in improving the standard of living of "those people". When I make public presentations to groups about Afghanistan, I always address and try to explain why visiting Americans used to be swept up by this kind of irrational, naive, and emotional "Pollyanna" feeling while visiting what really seemed to be the other side of the moon, populated by these, excuse me, illiterate, primitive, brutal, lovely people.
The story that I tell is about my future wife visiting Kabul in 1973:
She arrived in Kabul in 1973, alone, an unescorted and unveiled American female, blonde and blue-eyed, Christian and white, with her knowledge of Afghanistan and Islam pretty much having come from reading James Michener’s Caravans. She was taken in by complete strangers, received graciously by poor people, escorted around the country, welcomed as an honored guest, protected, taught, fed, and entertained, and shown deference in every way as a worthy human being and a private, moral person. She was introduced to a gentle but conservative form of Islam that was steeped in traditional acceptance and tolerance, not only of other "people of the book" (Jews and Christians who also worship the same God of Abraham), but who also often lived and worked alongside Buddhists, Sikhs, Hindus, and others. Many of these Afghan Muslims venerated pre-Islamic saints and healers, and many practiced a faith steeped in Sufi mysticism. She was escorted to the airport, and out of the country at the end of a month (which included the coup d’état that overthrew the king, Zahir Shah) with a bouquet of flowers and enduring memories of a truly remarkable experience. The kind of experiences that made her passionate about the country and its people.
About this time in my presentation, people are regarding me with surprise, and some obvious skepticism. I have to then point out that a lot has changed since then- and that it is important to ask what it is that has changed to push the children of those people from 1973 to becoming suicide bombers now- people who throw acid onto the faces of school girls, beat or even kill their sisters for talking to a boy on the street, and the "fanatics" we read and hear about on the news. It is also important to ask what America’s role was in these changes.
The most important influences have been Saudi Wahabism and other austere forms of radical Islam- the Deobandis and Salafis,- and the overlay of an 8th century Arabian peninsula desert tribal cultural framework within which these interpretations of Islam were evangelized to the Afghan people. This foreign influence has been working on Afghan cultural traditions and Islamic beliefs in a highly focused way since at least the 1970s, and represents a multi-generational, 50 year process.
In addressing the problem, those Afghans who have stood up and spoken out have been slapped down hard. That's one reason it is so difficult to rejuvenate the traditional village shura (local council) process. Hundreds, perhaps thousands of shura leaders in the Af-Pak Pashtun tribal belt, who rejected this radicalization of their faith and the usurpation of their legitimacy and authority, have been murdered. The survivors have been marginalized by gangs of illegal gun -toting power brokers. Their rural constituents live in fear and under the brutality of illegitimate thugs, who have co-opted the acceptable and traditionally recognized decision making processes, like the local shuras, which many would like to re-establish.
But another barrier to reverting to these traditional processes is that another power broker- the USA-finds these traditional authority structures to be anathema to the model of American electoral democracy which the Bush administration tried to promote to the Afghan people. Shuras perpetuate the power grip of the rural elites- mullahs, arbabs, khans, large landowners and the occasional intellectual, who can deliver patronage, protection, and projects to their local, isolated and illiterate constituents. To the dispassionate observer, these relationships really DO look a lot like American electoral democracy, with our political process driven by lobbyists and business, social, religious and other special interest groups. But to Washington, traditional Afghan patterns smell like theocracy, feudalism, chauvinism, and the exploitation of the farmer and female under classes by the privileged few, many of whom hold traditionally legitimate authority simply because they were “born to lead”.
The questions about traditional and progressive religious beliefs, and even regressive fundamentalism versus progressive fundamentalism, are a part of a much larger national identity crisis, power struggle, and morality play being acted out nationwide. Scholars argue whether there was ever an Afghan “tribe”, and if “Afghan” is synonymous with “Pashtun”. If you and your family stayed behind, bled, died, and fought the jihad against the Soviets, or emigrated to Virginia and drove taxi cabs, or were born and raised in a refugee camp in Iran and are returning to a country you have never seen or known before, the big question is: “What does it mean to be an Afghan?”
Where do Pashtunwali, Indian MTV, Hazaras, women in the workplace, the Q’uran translated into Dari, opium, electricity, educating girls, Dostum, Taliban, beer, Wahhabism, Pakistan, and such issues fit into what is now an emerging Afghan civil society and culture? And, who says so?
I submit that the solution does not lie in Pashtunwali, Afghan Islam, traditional processes, or American electoral democracy, or any of the other doctrinal “-isms”. You can position yourself at any end of the spectrum in any of these “solutions”, and still be an ethical, moral, conservative or progressive person, and treat people the way you, yourself, would like to be treated. You can be a devout Muslim, Jew, or Christian, a Buddhist, or a Hindu. Even an American or a Chinese. None of these descriptors, or perhaps ALL of them, can define your values- those things that you hold most important and closest to your heart- honesty, integrity, duty, courage, loyalty, honor, respect, and ….. whatever it is you want to put into the blank space.
Many will argue that the practice of religious faith is the underpinning of a civil society which results in regaining and perpetuating these values. But, we’ve already seen how faith can be twisted and manipulated for personal, political, and financial gain. For power. Unfortunately, Pashtunwali (and other codes of honor and justice in other non-Pashtun Afghan cultures) offered the social and cultural context within which this evangelizing of a manipulated interpretation of faith has occurred in the “tribal” culture in general, and the Pashtun community specifically. The fact is that there is nothing adaptive about Pashtunwali which makes its practitioners successful in a 21st century, globalized regional reality. Rather, it leaves them open to manipulation and exploitation by opportunistic and pernicious neighbors for whom Afghanistan is only a pawn in regional, or even global, geopolitics. Likewise, even Islam, as it was practiced prior to the interference of radicalized Caliphate jihadis and regressive, reactionary Wahhabis, does not provide an adequate platform for the necessary education, training, and employment which will allow Afghanistan to evolve from a nation of traders to becoming a nation of producers able to compete on the world stage. There is not much future in the world economy for a pre-industrial society.
My point, ultimately, is that Afghanistan’s underlying cultural patterns and processes only work (or worked) when Afghanistanwas largely isolated from the rest of the planet. Even if Afghans wanted to build a wall to “protect” their culture from the rest of the world, Wall Street, Madison Avenue, Hollywood, and the Pentagon will never allow this to happen, and neither will the Kremlin, Pakistani trucking companies, or Riyadh. There are just too many reasons for outsiders to interfere in internal Afghan matters.
Many point to past eras of Afghan history- periods of relative political and social calm, like the reign of Zahir Shah, as exemplary of a political environment which Afghans should now aspire to- not because it was a monarchy (although there are royalists even today), but because it was a federal structure which handled foreign affairs and international diplomacy, but left local affairs to local authorities. What these pundits fail to acknowledge is that these were also the times of maximum foreign intrigue and covert penetration- when Pakistanis, Americans, Russians, and others interloped in the isolated local power structures, largely undetected or controlled by the Capitol, and wove their intrigues with unsophisticated, illiterate, and unworldly locals who were clearly out of their league. Sure- the tribes rose up and threw out foreign armies of occupation from time to time, but in Afghanistan’s modern history, this is when the seeds of Wahhabism, communism, democracy, political Islam, and other foreign concepts were sown in the minds of both urban and rural Afghans who were ill equipped to understand the consequences of their receptivity and enthusiasm. It is no longer necessary to physically occupy a country to control its destiny.
At my bottled water plant in Pul-i-Charkhi, I made every effort to delegate to my staff the development of Afghan solutions for Afghan problems in the company. These solutions had to be implemented in a way that was consistent with my CEO concepts of time and space, progress and performance, and the specific social and financial goals of the company, but the solutions themselves were of local design within that context. We succeeded because I imposed an umbrella of international product quality standards, Good Manufacturing Practices (GMPs), and corporate goals which included making money while improving the quality of life of everyone we touched. And, we were audited financially. This experience is both replicable and scalable to a national level. The reason everybody got “on board” with the structure was because I was able to restate “Western” corporate goals in terms which were recognizable and acceptable to my Afghan employees, and they realized that their participation in our education, training, and employment opportunities moved them beyond the “zero-sum” social and economic rut that they were stuck in. In short, I was able to convince them to accept my goals as their own in a way that was acceptable and beneficial to all of us. When a member of the team did not cooperate, or was downright obstructionist because of cultural or other factors, the rest of the team marginalized him because they all understood that this person was holding us all back from the vision of prosperity and success that we had created. It couldn’t have happened without a legitimate leader with accepted authority, who had the power to implement and enforce decisions. In the case of this company, that was me.
Hamid Karzai was simply too naive, inexperienced and untested to have been successful in the role which he took as President of Afghanistan. So, we have arrived at this untenable position both internally and externally for the country. Now he, or his successor, has to understand that Afghanistan is a dot on a larger global map, and he must design and sell a plan for Afghanistan’s successful emergence into the global community. As previously stated, there are just too many reasons for too many outsiders to interfere in Afghanistan’s internal matters, and Afghans must be capable of managing these affairs, not the outsiders.
America’s stated goal for our intervention is to be sure that Afghanistan can never again be used as a platform from which al Qaida can attack us. Because we pursued this goal from 2001 to 2006 nearly entirely through military tactical operations, we are now still forced to continue to do so. But this goal is nonsense- al Qaida can launch an attack from Toronto, but we are not occupying Canada. While this military intervention is absolutely necessary and appropriate right now, ultimately, we are not going to accomplish our goal by killing people. Our goal needs to be for Afghanistan to emerge as a responsible and contributing member of the world community, according to the terms of that wider global community, not the terms of radical political Islamists, war criminals, or drug dealers. This will require Afghans to marginalize those who interfere with their progress, and thereby to ensure that their country is not used as a platform to attack us.
Accomplishing that goal is going to require nation building, and it is also going to require that Afghans elect leadership which is legitimate, smart, and strong enough to be able to manage America as their resource, not as their occupier. President Karzai does not understand how to manage American resources to reinforce his own power to succeed, and, rather, suffers as a result of failing to change the terms of reference from “War on Terror” to “War on Poverty, Illiteracy, and Greed”. He is also so far unable to reposition America as the country’s contractor, rather than it’s occupier.
There are many controversial models which can arguably be held up as exemplary for Afghans to study: Ataturk in Turkey, Pahlevi in Iran, Soeharto in Indonesia, Mahatir in Malaysia, Sheikh Mohammad in UAE. Of course, these secular heroes of modernization are reviled by most Afghans as apostates who sold their people down the river to a Godless economic prosperity and social revolution. It seems that the concept of “Islamic Republic” needs some debate and definition, but this debate must be channeled and supported by progressive Muslims, even progressive fundamentalists, who share the goal of Afghan success, rather than continued exploitation. When these leaders emerge, they must be protected, encouraged, financed, published, and given full access to the world stage. We in the so-called “West” may not like all their solutions, but we need to understand that our solutions will simply be rejected out of hand. We need to take our small successes where we find them, rather than demanding “all-in” outcomes.
America really does, and must, hold the keys to success in Afghanistan. Not because we’re so smart, but because, if we don’t, history shows that somebody else will. If Afghans are left to their own devices without strong and legitimate leadership, and under the nearly complete breakdown of law and order and a lack of an underlying foundation of civil social infrastructure, Afghan solutions to Afghan problems will continue to be fraudulent elections, pardoned drug kingpins, a thriving narco economy, and massive human rights abuses against the weaker segments of society. If we retreat, our place will be filled by illegal Afghan power brokers of the most reprehensible sort, and by the agents and interests of Pakistan, China, Iran, Russia, Saudi Arabia, and all the other opportunists like al-Qaida who manipulated and exploited Afghanistan to be the enemy of their enemies, and which have driven the country to its current and horrific desolation. Previous power and leadership vacuums were filled by zealots and others who used Afghanistanas a training base for terrorists, who continue to attack us and our allies.
America needs to make a total, multi-front, and long-term commitment to this effort, or someone else will. And, as the expression goes, “Americans have all the watches, but the insurgents have all the time”. We need to accept that the cost can be in thousands of lives and billions of dollars now, or hundreds of thousands of lives and trillions of dollars ten years from now. Who, and what, would we prefer, and what will be the outcome? Who else has the national character, the resources, and even the practical and moral capacity to address this challenge (given that it must be addressed) in a way that acknowledges that Afghans matter most, that it is all about Afghanistan and its place in the world community of nations, and that long term stability and even prosperity are possible?
The conversation cannot be framed in terms of the cost of success. It has to be framed by the cost of failure. We have seen the consequences of these failures before.
The conversation also needs to be addressed in terms of our obligations to Afghanistan. Yes, our obligations. Some will argue that we are obliged because we opportunistically exploited Afghanistan in our cold war against the Soviets in the 1970s and 1980s. Afghanistan was a pawn in William Colby and Ronald Reagan’s successful strategy, and the country and the people were devastated. For us, this was a triumph- for the Afghans, a disaster. When the Afghan theater was won and the Soviets withdrew, we simply abandoned our Afghan allies to fend for themselves in the ruins, creating a power vacuum that led to protracted civil war, manipulation by Pakistan, and eventually to the rise of the Taliban and the emergence of safe havens for al- Qaida. More recently, Americareneged on its promise, presented personally by US President George W. Bush in April, 2003 at the US/Afghan Investment Conference in Chicago, to mount a new “Marshall Plan for Afghanistan”. I was there. I heard it. We would rebuild what had been destroyed in 35 years of war, and develop agriculture and industry. Afghans rejoiced. After 35 years of deprivation, brutal conflict, isolation, and horror, help was on the way.
A month later, the administration was furiously backpedaling on the Afghan Marshall Plan, and Secretary Rumsfeld and President Bush were both sneering, “We don’t do nation building”. Soon after, when it was pointed out that drugs were an endemic problem that needed to be addressed in the name of security, Defense Secretary Rumsfeld scoffed, “We don’t do drugs”, as in, it is not something that US forces would tackle. Military, State Department, DEA, and other agencies wrangled regularly over missions, tactics, strategies, and authority. US forces were focused on hunting down al Qaida, and were largely withdrawn into the Iraq war effort. Development programs were fragmented, generally ill conceived, poorly implemented, under resourced, and farmed out to two or three prime contractors who were unable and/or unwilling to confer or cooperate within the larger international development assistance community. On a per capita basis, funding for development projects stalled at a small fraction of what was committed to Bosnia. In 2006, studies showed that 18% of AID money spent “on” Afghan projects was actually spent “in” Afghanistan. Instead of “take, hold, build”, the current mantra of US forces in Afghanistan, the Bush mantra was “attack, kill, withdraw”.
Where is Afghanistan’s peace dividend?
It appears that experienced and wiser voices in our military on the ground in Afghanistan have finally prevailed, and that the Pentagon is listening. The appointment of General Stanley McChrystal as Commander of both ISAF and US forces in Afghanistanreflects a correct and hopefully deepening understanding by Washingtonthat it is necessary to move from “big army” tactics to a more localized, personal counterinsurgency warfare strategy employing multiple resources, including human intelligence on the ground. The change in orientation toward protecting the population is the right thing to do over the longer term, and “long term” is the only way to address our desired outcomes.
Anyone who has ever been witness to the kind of operations being conducted in Helmand right now knows that you don’t want to be in the middle of it. Anybody who has actually conducted such an operation knows that taking even calculated steps to protect the populace increases risks to our own forces and reduces probabilities of mission tactical success. This strategy has already resulted in higher US and ISAF casualties, but it will immediately pay off in showing the Afghan people that we are really on their side. This is the most important first step that we can make to demonstrate that they have a choice between us and the insurgents. Most Afghans caught up in military operations will concede that they were in the wrong place at the wrong time; that they are, in fact, tied in some way (even innocently) by association to insurgents, and that coalition operations are not arbitrary or capricious. They will also acknowledge that insurgents bait coalition airstrikes to maximize civilian casualties.
One of the main reasons for the effectiveness of our greater level of care is that it acknowledges our accountability to the people, and accountability for the powerful is a cornerstone of the concept of legitimacy in Afghanistan, just like anywhere else. When remote drones or fighter jets bomb and kill people in your village anonymously, or troops sweep through, leaving carnage in their wake and simply disappear into the dust, local populations are not only killed, wounded, and their property destroyed, they are left with no hope and no recourse. It is this perception of abuse and mayhem with impunity that so outrages them, making them so susceptible to calls for vengeance and retribution. After all, it is the agents of the government killing them, but yet that enemy is somehow faceless and inhuman. Aggrieved people must be recognized and compensated. We must demonstrate, by our actions, that their future is with us, and not those who would manipulate them with empty promises, use them as human shields, keep them as serfs in a largely mafia driven economy, and contrive to hold them in ignorance and poverty.
In this struggle to win over the local populace and show them that ours is the side to be on, the risks have gone up. But the stakes couldn’t be higher. Afghanistan can still be recovered, because Afghans do not love the Taliban or al Qaida. Although daily news reporting on our TV does not reflect it, America, and what we generally demonstrate that we stand for, is well loved in Afghanistan by a large majority of the people. Even taking into account the differences in literacy, access to information, and quality of life, the vast majority of both rural and urban populations in all but a few districts would choose a legitimate, American supported republic over a Pakistani supported Taliban theocracy. If only they had a choice. When we are told that the “insurgents” control 1/3 of the country, we have to recognize that theirs is a rule by intimidation, retribution, and terror. We also have to understand that the locals are “playing the odds”- it never pays to be on the wrong side after a conflict, because losers become the new exploited. We absolutely abandoned them in 1989, effectively again in 2003, and now, where should they place their trust?
jfrasche@gmail.com
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Per Jim Frasche, June 24, 2009
Please note this article on Afghan agriculture, the best and most positive I have seen in a long time:
Tough Love For Washington And Kabul
By: James W. D. Frasché, Former Chief Operating Officer, Afghanistan Natural Beverages, Kabul; and Deputy Director, International Foundation of Hope, Jalalabad, Afghanistan
Summary: Currently articulated US policy goals in Afghanistan focus only on the visible and symptomatic manifestations of their deeper, underlying causes.
The four primary underlying causes of the current Afghan tragedy are:
America’s tough love for the Afghan government requires that we push hard to demonstrate determined, impartial and continuous resolve in addressing the claims of aggrieved Afghan citizens against those who have committed, and continue to commit, crimes against humanity in Afghanistan. This can be accomplished by reconstituting and empowering the Afghan Truth and Reconciliation Court (or another internationalized chamber within the Afghan court system); revoking 2007 legislation forgiving war crimes and affording immunity to offenders; establishing and implementing an Afghan War Crimes Tribunal at the International Criminal Court and/or a UN ad hoc tribunal to address crimes committed prior to February, 2003 (the date Afghanistan became a party to the Rome statute). President Hamid Karzai, or his successor, will have no credibility with the Afghan people until he demonstrates his own and his administration’s commitment to serving the Afghan nation, rather than his personal constituencies, by prosecuting war criminals and illegal power brokers. This action will stimulate an Afghan national concept and identity which are still critically missing factors in the equation of national unity. US policy-driven measures must transparently address Afghan concerns of legitimacy and authority in government. Additionally, we must work with Afghans and the international community to develop vertically integrated and realistic alternative livelihoods for Afghan poppy farmers, while simultaneously and relentlessly prosecuting post-harvest, down-stream drug racketeers. There are many laudable and appropriate international development assistance programs being implemented by the international community in concert with legitimate Afghan decision makers, which should not be discounted, but which are compromised because of a lack of focused efforts addressing government legitimacy, enforcing the basic foundations of the rule of law, war crimes restitution, and realistic alternative livelihoods. Addressing these four core issues will do more to stabilize the Afghan government, destabilize the Taliban movement, improve internal security, and provide a basis for Afghans to personally participate in their own social, economic, and political future than any other foreign military intervention or assistance efforts. Afghan tough love for America requires that Afghanistan demand America’s enduring commitment over the long term to protect Afghanistan’s territorial, economic, and political integrity against the illegal internal power brokers and regional manipulators who seek to use Afghanistan as a tool to further their own geo-political and economic goals. It also requires that America demonstrate confidence in legitimate Afghan leaders to work through accepted and traditionally understood decision making processes to develop what must necessarily be uniquely Afghan solutions to their own problems. It is not reasonable to expect to achieve US security goals in Afghanistan under an imposed political and economic model which is, in many ways, anathema to traditional Afghan governance and social patterns and processes. America and the West has to accept that these Afghan solutions might not immediately replicate our own vision of appropriate social or political models fully incorporating our own increasingly progressive definitions of electoral democracy and human rights.
American Policy In Afghanistan
In a July 26 interview in which he addressed his goals for Afghanistan, Presidential Candidate Barack Obama said:
“…..We should want to get out of there as quickly as we can and help the Afghans govern themselves and provide for their own security. Our critical goal should be to make sure that the Taliban and al Qaida are routed and that they cannot project threats against us from that region.”
I assume that this is still a reasonable summary of the new administration’s goals in Afghanistan. Rather than take President Obama’s pledge of more than 30,000 additional American troops for the Afghan theater (roughly doubling our current troop strength) as an apparent turn-around from the stated desire to “get out of there quickly”, I regard it as a stop-gap measure to demonstrate President Obama’s recognition of the critical nature of the Afghan “problem”. It will allow more breathing room to train and upgrade Afghan police and military capacity, and also strengthen the coalition’s military position to negotiate with Afghan and other interests over the next phase of our engagement there. In spite of the potentially limited benefits of such a massive investment of American military resources, and the equally apparent down-side risks, I am all for it if they are deployed within a more insightful policy framework.
President Obama and his advisors are only now beginning to formulate and implement what will hopefully be a new and well planned direction. However, at this time, the stated goals only address surface manifestations of deeper social, political, and economic woes that plague Afghanistan - problems that continue to severely limit the effectiveness of conventional US bilateral assistance and military support programs, and defy the US doctrine that defines them.
Differing Perceptions Of The Issues, And The Need For Perceptive Action
In spite of the high costs in American human and financial capital to date, and whether we like it or not, Afghans generally feel that these goals belie a relatively short-term, self-serving US national security interest written (in some isolation) in Washington. This is in contrast to what they would consider to be goals reflecting a long-term and shared interest in Afghan national integrity which would truly free the Afghan people to take control of their own destiny on their own terms. This skepticism has historical roots in the Afghan people’s perception of Americans as “users”, supported by their collective memory of US “abandonment” of Afghanistan immediately after the Soviets left Afghanistan in 1989. This departure created a vacuum that plunged the country into civil war. It is also based in their view that we currently address only our own self-serving tactical security goals at the expense of true reform, such as our so far futile search for Osama bin Laden and our imbalanced concentration of resources on al-Qaida, neither of which are prominent on Afghans’ radar screens. President Bush’s initial pledge to provide a “New Marshall Plan for
Afghanistan”, is viewed as rhetoric, since
Americasubstantially reduced its commitment to
Afghanistanin favor of
Iraqin 2003. Most Afghans fear that it is too late to recover from this lapse in the face of rampant government corruption, the rise of drug mafias and other criminal gangs, and the resurgence of the Taliban (an often misused term). We are roundly blamed by many Afghans for this current state of affairs because we are seen as having imposed illegitimate leadership on the country; as having failed to consult accepted Afghan channels to design, finance, and implement the redevelopment effort; and for our failure to require accountability of Afghan officials and foreign contractors, which created a ripe environment for rampant embezzlement and graft.
Within this context, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, Secretary General of NATO, in his January 18 editorial in the Washington Post, correctly asserts:
“The basic problem in Afghanistan is not too much Taliban; it's too little good governance. Afghans need a government that deserves their loyalty and trust; when they have it, the oxygen will be sucked away from the insurgency.”, and that “…we are obliged to keep ramping up the military operation partly because of insufficient resources and coordination on the civilian side.”
It is critical that US policy makers, and the American public at large, clearly understand these fundamental truths as we move forward in the “war on terror” and in pursuit of achievable goals in Afghanistan. How do we reconcile goals of Afghan self-governance and security within the context of a corrupt Afghan government, insufficient civilian resources, and a resurgent Taliban? How do we reconcile a US public (and electorate), tired and skeptical after 7 years of apparently inconclusive and certainly costly conflict, with the reality of the consequences of “failure” in Afghanistan? What are the consequences of this possible failure?
Before proposing any answers or solutions, let me first suggest a simple, comprehensive , highly idealistic but achievable goal statement which would best serve both Afghan and American long-term interests:
“To facilitate, support, and ultimately enable the Afghan people to actively participate in their own social, economic, and political future, free of exploitation by their own opportunistic power brokers, and free of the manipulation of their neighbors”.
If we accept this goal statement, anyone with a deep understanding of the Afghan situation can confirm that it is relatively easy to move on to the real issues, the most prominent of which are both cause and effect in a mutually reinforcing, vicious circle:
- security,
- Afghan government legitimacy and credibility, and
- drugs.
I am not going to address military tactical or strategic issues here, other than by allusion, because I am not qualified to do so. Our troops on the ground in Afghanistan continue to exhibit the highest commitment, courage, dedication, and sacrifice in fulfilling their goals, which tend to be understated and often misunderstood here at home. Furthermore, just because no clear strategy for the planned troop surge has been articulated for public consumption does not mean that a strategy does not exist.
Obviously, all three issues of security, legitimacy, and drugs are related and interdependent, and it is pointless to debate which must be addressed before the other. It is clearly a process, and a journey, with many roads being traveled at once. Military and security goal achievement generally can be articulated in a statistical format well understood by analysts, politicians, and the public, and it is a largely subjective process dominated by body counts, hectares of territory taken and held, numbers of Afghan troops and police trained, quantitative levels of armed conflict, etc. Achievement of corruption and drug-related goals is much more complex by definition and requires a much more complex matrix of criteria to quantify. More importantly, it requires a far more radical and, in the case of any US policy makers with an evangelical enthusiasm for electoral democracy and human rights in Afghanistan, an often counter- intuitive strategy to achieve long term goals. It also requires an in-depth understanding of and willingness to engage traditional Afghan patterns and processes (using anthropological definitions of these terms) which may be anathema to western defined socio-political causes over the short term.
Where Corruption In Afghanistan Comes From
Afghanistan
has emerged from 30 years of war dominated by a small number of internal Afghan power brokers, most of whom are viewed by the public at large as illegitimate in their positions of power. Many of these “players” are known war criminals who have perpetrated unimaginable crimes against their own countrymen, or common criminals, i.e., drug mafia, weapons smugglers, etc. In the absence of any underlying Afghan legal, legislative, or executive government infrastructure which would support even the rudiments of a civil society like that which we Americans often take for granted, these thugs continue to opportunistically appropriate the water, land, livestock, and other property of their weaker constituents. They order fearful and brutal retaliation against critics and political opponents who dare to publicly challenge them, and openly and blatantly exploit (by systematic beatings, murder, rape, torture, kidnapping, and other forms of extreme intimidation), anyone who does not have the power to resist. While we in the West tend to incorrectly categorize these gun holders, drug dealers, weapons merchants, criminal gangs, and militia commanders generically as “warlords”, this is a simplistic generalization which can be self defeating when it comes to understanding who they really are; what kind of relationship we should have with them; and how we should ultimately deal with them. These illegal actors have nearly totally displaced (often with our support) and subverted the legitimate community, tribal, provincial, and national power structures which are understood and traditionally respected by the Afghan people. Many of them are actually our surrogates, and are therefore now identified (by association) with the USA in maintaining security in broad swaths of the country where we are otherwise unable to maintain security ourselves because our forces are grossly under-resourced for the task at hand.
This illegitimate power structure extends to the highest positions of government, including the President’s immediate family, and to his “tribe” (another widely misused and misunderstood term in the Afghan context). In a complex system of patronage, this illegitimate power structure also extends pervasively to the lowest echelons of the army, the police and the government bureaucracy. Above all else, Afghans expect legitimacy in their leadership. It may sound quaint, but it needs to be taken absolutely seriously. If Afghan leadership in shuras (or councils), government, the police, or other positions of authority is not appointed by well known and well understood traditional processes, then that leadership is seen as illegitimate. If leadership is illegitimate, then it has no legal authority. Without authority, it has no legitimate power to make binding decisions, mediate or resolve conflicts, or make and enforce rules- in short, there is no recognized authority or legitimate power to perform the required and expected functions of government. In the ultimate fulfillment of the maxim that “likes beget likes”, illegal leaders, police, military, and council members appoint illegal underlings who create illegal obligations and dependencies, and demand payments to perform the routine daily tasks of government- enforcing the law, providing protection from criminals, licensing business functions, clearing customs, taxation, etc. These underlings then appoint sub-underlings, who appoint sub-sub underlings, and the process continues down to the traffic policemen who “control” every street intersection, all of whom are engaged in graft. This level of pervasive illegitimacy results in chaos, and, in Afghanistan, this ultimately leads to the opportunistic exploitation of the weak (the great majority of the population) by the strong (the few). Through a perverse pyramid effect, even the weak participate- by exploiting the weaker, continually down the line until there is nobody weaker to exploit, ending finally with the poorest of the poor, who pay proportionately the highest price.
It should be noted that the foreign community in general, international development assistance organizations specifically, the US military, NATO and their contractors, all play a huge role in the opacity and corresponding ease of illegal diversions of funds, and the overall dilution and corruption of post-9/11 foreign cash flows to Afghanistan. We have created many of the opportunities for Afghan embezzlers to act with impunity, and our own nationals and our third-country contractors also need to be exposed and brought to justice. It is not just an “Afghan” problem.
“Corruption” in Afghanistan, therefore, is just another word for “a total lack of accountability”, and, when the abusers are the very officials who are supposed to protect the people, and are generally defined as “government”, then the people have no hope. In an atmosphere of total cynicism, chaos ensues, and it becomes rapidly obvious that the maintenance of chaos, rather than the creation of stability, is in the best interests of the few who hold illegitimate power. Chaos in Afghanistan is also arguably in the perceived best interests of many of its neighbors. This adds to the complexity of the model, has historically been a source of befuddlement for the American policy establishment, and has bedeviled American policy implementation in the region for decades.
What to Do About Corruption In Afghanistan
Because corruption starts at the top, this is the best place to immediately address it. While the legitimacy of the election of President Hamid Karzai, and the incredible, subsequent squandering of the popular support of the majority of his countrymen are matters of growing public disgust, he can overcome these deficits by taking radical measures to show that he is truly a public servant, rather than the slave of the illegal power brokers and his tainted personal constituents. He can do this only with tremendous personal sacrifice. It may be too late, for him personally, but the desired results can be achieved by him, or his successor, if the following proposed actions are executed with decisive and relentless resolve:
Activate Afghanistan’s “Truth and Reconciliation Court” (TRC). You will be hard pressed to find any reference to this Court on any Afghan government web site or forum. A viable alternative would be an internationalized chamber elsewhere within the Afghan criminal justice system. President Karzai has stated that the country is not ready to confront it’s past, and in 2007, the
USAand the international community stood by, largely silent, as the Afghan Parliament, many members of which have been implicated by credible witnesses as war criminals, passed two amnesty bills forgiving crimes committed during the civil war. The Court needs to be reconvened, reconstituted, and re-empowered to pursue the interests of the aggrieved, which represents millions (yes, millions) of the Afghan people, and represents the full demographic spectrum of the Afghan population.
There are two groups of “power brokers” that President Karzai needs to expose and bring to public and transparent hearings, and, thereby, to justice. They are broadly defined as war criminals, or those committing mass crimes against humanity, and drug racketeers. The two are interrelated. Unfortunately, this late in the game, corruption at the highest levels of government can be eliminated only at a huge personal cost to President Karzai, a Poppalzai Pashtun from Kandahar. This is because the problem, as represented by the “drug racketeer” group, is known to start within his own family, clan, tribe, and province. These are the sources of President Karzai’s power and support, and are the constituents that he is obliged to enrich and protect by tradition and custom. They, their comrades and competing drug mafias, are the source of much of the opium revenue generated in Kandahar and Helmand provinces, comprising something on the order of 90% of the world’s illegal opium production, and reportedly as much as 70% of the Afghan economy. Their power and connections at local, regional, national, and even international levels effectively provide immunity from prosecution. Because of the shear magnitude of their crimes, they should be thoroughly investigated, and, if there is a reasonable probability of guilt, apprehended by motivated and specially trained Afghan army or police units supported by international coalition forces. For cases beyond the capabilities of the TRC or other internationalized chamber, they can be charged and brought to trial at an Afghan War Crimes Tribunal at the International Criminal Court in The Hague, or a special UN court (per the Bosnia model) empowered by the UN Security Council to hear charges against Afghan war criminals and drug king pins.
Anyone questioning our ability to deliver these alleged criminals to these courts or Tribunals need only recall the ability of American agents under the Bush administration to commit extraordinary renditions of third-country terror suspects from European streets for delivery to torture chambers in the Middle East and Eastern Europe for interrogation in the “war on terror”. Where there is a will, there is a way. And, unlike extraordinary renditions, we would be working with world opinion, rather than against it.
One prime candidate for narcotics charges investigation and exposure is President Karzai’s younger brother, Ahmad Wali Karzai. In 2006, the US Embassy announced an investigation of Ahmad Wali Karzai, and then let the case evaporate, pointing to a lack of local Afghan resources and political will to prosecute such a suspect as justification for our inaction. This is seen by the population at large as positive proof of our collusion with the Karzai regime to underwrite and perpetuate the ethical bankruptcy of the Karzai government, principally for simple expediency and financial profit. It is seen by non-Pashtun Afghans as clear evidence of Pashtun manipulation of the national political process and the government. Anyone who is knowledgeable and even aware of the situation sees the lack of investigation of the President’s brother as confirmation of the truly magnificent and twisted ease with which our enemies are able to use illegal but officially sanctioned drug profits to finance their acts of terror and foment chaos to discredit the Afghan government, the international community, and the rule of law.
The other criminal group of interest comprises those who traditionally have been grouped together under the label of “war criminals”, and which includes not only those who tortured, murdered, raped, and otherwise brutalized segments of the Afghan population during their nearly 35 years of armed conflict, but also those who continue to do so now. Many are shielded by their high level positions in the Afghan government, their “special relationships” with other illegal Afghan power brokers, or with units of foreign intelligence agencies who value them or their role in the provincial security apparatuses which have been sanctioned and even actively supported by the
USand other foreign governments.
A prime candidate for war crimes charges, and more recent charges of murder, torture, rackets, and other crimes, is General Abdul Raschid Dostum, the Uzbek militia commander (and so much more), until recently operating out of Maimana in northern Afghanistan. General Dostum was recently “exiled” to Turkey as a result of his reportedly ordering the second multiple gang- rape of an Afghan government official who had dared to criticize him in public. During the Afghan civil war, Dostum reportedly murdered thousands (yes, thousands) of Taliban Pashtun prisoners of war by loading them into sealed ocean containers, shooting, and purposefully suffocating them. Mass graves have been found by international coalition forces; there are credible eye-witness testimonials (reportedly by US SOF personnel, among others); and there are many more charges. In 2001, even knowing who Dostum really was, as one of our “key allies in the war on terror”, we awarded him the responsibility of maintaining security and stability for much of the northern 25% of the country, where he continued brutalizing his charges until his “exile” late in 2008. Exiling Gen. Dostum to Turkey (where he has been welcomed previously with open arms as the protector of Turkic- language speakers in Afghanistan) is a form of early retirement, is a total abandonment of his victims, and is a blatant insult to the survivors of his systematic abuse.
Hamid Karzai would open a new era in public confidence in his regime if he were to use all the tools at his disposal- like US and NATO forces acting in concert with properly trained and managed Afghan security forces- to support a meaningful reconstitution of the Truth and Reconciliation Court or establishment of an internationalized chamber, and to bring perpetrators to justice at an Afghan Tribunal at the International Criminal Court or UN Tribunal. He should do this not only to prosecute the criminals that have been imposed upon him, and allowed himself to be surrounded by, but, more importantly, to provide a national forum for the grievances of the Afghan people to be heard. There are many models for national commissions which have been a vehicle for national reconciliation, for aggrieved citizens to confront their tormentors, for compensation to be paid, apologies to be given, justice served, and the healing to begin. But, arguably at this juncture, the most important benefit would be for Hamid Karzai to stand up and to show his people that he stands for them as a nation, even at the expense of his cronies. Pashtuns would see their Uzbek tormenters, Hazaras would see their Pashtun tormenters, Kabulis would see their Tajik tormenters, all brought to accountability, without the accusers suffering a personal fear of retribution. Seeing the end of favoritism as a basis for the dispensation of justice would be a huge step toward a nationalist concept which is largely absent, and lend hope to millions that there is a future assured for them in a Constitution, rather than denied, or assured, because of their individual socio-economic origin.
Why Is There So Much Opium Poppy In Afghanistan Right Now?
When I was in Afghanistan in 1972-5, the country was the second largest national net exporter of dried fruit, specifically raisins, in the world, and was nearly self sufficient in food production. There were massive agricultural/ integrated rural development projects, like the Helmand river valley irrigation and hydropower scheme (a USAID project), and these resources were further developed by the Soviets during their occupation 1978-1989, especially in Nangarhar Province. Afghanistan has a long and successful agricultural and horticultural history. Opium and hashish have always been a part of it, albeit less than now.
Even if a farmer is blessed with good weather, has the required know-how, and access to other inputs like fertilizer and pesticide, water, etc., being successful requires more than just an ability to produce nice fruit and vegetables. It also requires access to markets (roads and a practical and inexpensive means of transportation), and a network of other agro-industrial resources like processing, packaging, storage, and distribution facilities. Without these inputs and resources, produce must be consumed or traded locally, and, in Afghanistan, most “local” markets are small, poor, and widely dispersed. This relegates remote, rural producers to a barter economy, and it is difficult to sell crops for cash. You trade your eggplant for my wheat. I trade the wheat for potatoes, etc. What if I need antibiotics, or fuel, or clothing?
The lion’s share of opium in Afghanistan is grown away from major roads and transportation, and in non-irrigated, dry-land farming areas far from markets, where farmers are dirt poor. Many do not have irrigation wells, and, even if they did, could not afford the pump or the fuel to run it to get the water to irrigate their crops. They cannot afford fertilizer and pesticides to grow marketable produce. They cannot afford it because they have no cash, and they have no cash because they have no practical access to markets. Their tomatoes and other produce would spoil or be battered to pulp, before they could be taken the necessary distance by donkey cart or trader’s truck to a market to be sold for cash.
Opium, on the other hand, is easy and inexpensive to grow. A dealer comes to a farmer’s home, pays him a substantial down payment, and gives him poppy seeds. The farmer basically throw these seeds on the un-irrigated ground, and, a few months later, when the plants are mature, he scrapes the raw opium off the scored flower pods and puts it in a bag for the dealer, who pays the remaining cash balance, and leaves. The farmer doesn’t have to make any investment, the raw opium can travel for weeks without degrading, there are no marketing or food processing problems, and the farmer supports his family throughout the cycle with cash rather than barter.
The Afghan farmer has no conscious desire to participate in a criminal enterprise, no religious or political motivation to poison American youth with heroin, or to do anything other than feed his family. Afghanistan is an agricultural economy. It is a nation of farmers.
What To Do About The Opium Poppy (Drug) Problem In Afghanistan:
Incredulous, many will point out that Afghan farmers have grown wealthy from easy money from growing poppy, and that no other “even more profitable crops” exist. Both sentiments are patently false. Without investment in irrigation and other infrastructure which can extend growing seasons, rural, remote, unprotected Afghan “dollar-a-day” farmers are still “dollar-a-day” farmers, no matter what crop they grow. In the case of poppy growers, they do not directly benefit from the exorbitant profits reaped in the down-stream value chain or markets for their crop. While they have some security in their relationship with their seed suppliers, if their crop fails after receiving the initial performance deposit, the consequences can be dire, and they have no recourse. They are, in fact, weak in their position, and have no access to alternative markets for their crop.
There are several alternative crops, mostly horticultural, which compete very favorably against poppy as a revenue source for Afghan farmers, even in the current markets, given a certain quality of presentation and access to those markets. Even as unprocessed produce, apricots, almonds, sour oranges, and pomegranates are all attractive on a per-hectare basis. Additionally, Afghan produce enjoys an excellent reputation, and is in high demand, in other regional markets in India, Russia, the UAE, and elsewhere. With the introduction of world-class processing and distribution support, there is no reason why Afghan produce cannot compete on a global standard. By making investments in value-added agro processing for export markets, Afghanistan has the capacity to mount a very credible export revenue generator. This is immediately demonstrated by the fact that Afghan produce is currently available in many of these markets, courtesy of Pakistani food processors. As an aside, many assert that
Pakistan, which operates fleets of trucks to purchase and bring Afghan fruit to
Pakistanfor processing (and often for sale back into Afghan markets) has made a concerted, multi-faceted effort to stunt Afghan agro industry to protect its own position in this lucrative value chain.
The keys to success in reducing the pernicious corruption and wide spread drug production in Afghanistan rest in these and other concerted actions. In working with respected and publicly acknowledged Afghan leaders to identify tactics and strategies that work, the real results will come from consistently, honestly, and doggedly following up on these measures from the top down, when it comes to apprehension of criminals of all kinds, from all “tribes”, over the long term. Past practice has been for the government to submit to some public outrage and to arrest a protected offender with great fanfare, and then to release him quietly when nobody is paying attention. The effort needs to be real, systematic, permanent and fair. Drug cultivation will decrease when there are practical, and more attractive opportunities for farmers. Poppy cultivation is a business which allows farmers to raise their families. We have allowed poppy farming to become politicized by our inattention to this ultimate reality, by our propensity to define solutions to the drug issue in moralistic terms, and to sometimes opportunistically use the drug sub-economy to our own short-term advantage militarily or politically.
Conclusions
Modern Afghan culture has been driven to a large extent by foreign manipulation and indoctrination (especially of the extremist kind), and has emerged after 35 years of conflict as an opportunistic culture, with a “zero- sum” mentality. But the visible manifestations of greed, violence, exploitation, and criminality mask an underlying and traditional culture of values which we Americans will recognize as our own- honor, integrity, courage, duty, service and loyalty. No rational person who has been to Afghanistan in the last 30 years sees an opportunity to establish “some sort of Central Asian Valhalla” in Afghanistan, as DOD Secretary Gates rather condescendingly remarked in testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on January 27. We Americans (and others in the international community) only need to make a long term commitment to provide enough breathing room to legitimate Afghan leaders and to the greater, victimized masses of the Afghan population to rediscover those values from their traditions, to plot a direction that makes sense to them and is sustainable within their cultural context, and to become more adaptive to a globalized 21st century reality. If we do not, they will simply continue to be manipulated and exploited by the worst elements that their own society and the region can offer.
It is critical that we recognize that western notions and definitions of modernization, progress and performance- even time and space- are inextricably entwined in the Afghan psyche with imperialism, foreign interference, and occupation. Many of the manipulators and exploiters are adept at exploiting these preconceptions. Predictably, the most conservative elements of the tribal and religious establishments will respond to any perceived threats to their doctrines with regressive, rather than progressive fundamentalist initiatives. A sound plan and response to these initiatives would recognize that the foreign radical doctrines (Wahabi, al-Qaida/ Quetta shura, etc.) which have been foisted off on the Afghan people over the last 30+ years are anathema to traditional Afghan Islamic practice and are alien and unwelcome to the vast majority of the Afghan people. Again, Afghan solutions proposed and implemented without fear of recrimination, rather than foreign imposed solutions, will be the key to our success. America and the West has to accept that these Afghan solutions might not immediately replicate our own vision of appropriate social or political models fully incorporating our own increasingly progressive definitions of electoral democracy and human rights. Yes, “
Valhalla” is a long way off. But we can achieve a much higher return on our investment in
Afghanistanif we calibrate our expectations around efforts addressing government legitimacy, enforcing the basic foundations of the rule of law, war crimes restitution, and realistic alternative livelihoods for poppy growers while relentlessly prosecuting drug racketeers.
Many hopeful westerners point to revolutionary, historical modernizers in Muslim countries whom we would like to see emulated in Afghanistan- “Where in Afghanistan”, you might ask, “is your Kemal Ataturk (Founder of the Turkish Republic), Shah Pahlevi (Shah of Iran until 1978), or your Sheikh Mohammad (Ruler of Dubai)?” Aghast, most Afghans will point out that they are all apostates who secularized their nations and betrayed their own people to the will of the West. Our solutions hold no credence. The challenge is to find ways to show Afghans that it is in their best interests to adopt more adaptive patterns and processes which will enable them, and show them that it is possible, to be successful as a nation and a people in the 21st century.
What are the consequences of failure? As we all know, history has a way of repeating itself. We created a vacuum by abruptly withdrawing support from Afghanistan in 1989 when the Soviet Red Army retreated. The result was years of civil war, displacement of millions to camps in Pakistan and Iran, the radicalization of a previously moderate and modernizing society, the rise of the Taliban, the creation of training camps from where al-Qaida sent teams to bomb our embassies, blow up our ships, hijack our aircraft……
Achievement of the ultimate goal that the Taliban and al Qaida will be routed and unable to attack us again will never occur as a milestone event. It can only be continuously achieved as an ongoing, long term process requiring constant vigilance. To question whether we have the time, the patience and the money to pursue such a comprehensive goal (as Mr. Gates did in his January 27 testimony) is to admit both a lack of understanding of the region, and a lack of understanding of what is at stake. Any vacuum created by our inaction or less than full commitment, or by our less than continuous focus in the foreseeable future will be filled by local and regional opportunists who are, by our default, more serious and driven than we are, and who will continue to exploit these Muslim, uneducated, largely agrarian, and cynical but somehow still hopeful people.
We Americans, and others, are doing much in Afghanistan which is right. Education, training, and employment; physical infrastructure and development; military, police, and other security force and institution building; integrated rural development and agricultural schemes- and many other efforts- all have a role in supporting Afghanistan’s emergence into a regional geo-political reality, and in helping Afghans to find a successful niche in a globalized world economy. But they will all be to no avail if there is no underlying rule of law and no civil society as underpinnings to their sustainability. This can only occur in an atmosphere presided over by legitimate Afghan leadership, where there is truly blind justice; where the people can pursue life, liberty, prosperity and happiness in a reasonably secure environment.
Additional comments by Jim Frasche made by email the week of May 11, 2009
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